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BUY AND SELL AGREEMENTS AND THE WIDOW'S RIGHTS
In a closely held corporation the everyday affairs of the business are
usually carried on by its owners without aid from non-shareholder managers. The shareholders are in close contact with each other in the same
way as partners are in a partnership. It is therefore not surprising that
shareholders desire the right to choose future associates and thus prevent
outsiders from entering the business. Frequently, restrictions are placed
on the transferability of shares so that control can be maintained.'
One commonly used type of restriction, known as the "buy and sell
agreement," 2 permits the surviving shareholders to purchase the shares
m 3
of a deceased shareholder for a specified price.
Some buy and sell agreements obligate the survivors to purchase the deceased's shares; others
merely give them an option to do so. 4 Although first option agreements
were originally held invalid as arbitrary and unreasonable restraints on
7
6
alienation, 5 their legality is now established in most jurisdictions.
1 Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 VA. L.
Rxv. 229, 229-30 (1951). For a detailed discussion of stock transfer restrictions, see
2 O'NEAr, CLosE CoRpoRATioNs § 7 (1958).
While absolute restrictions which prohibit transferability of shares have been
said to be void as against the public policy of allowing and promoting the free transfer
of property, Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 599, 124 Atl. 118, 119 (1924)
(dictum) ; Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 540, 141 N.E.2d 812, 814-15,
161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421-22 (1957) (dictum); Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc.
646, 656, 177 N.Y. Supp. 873, 878 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (dictum) ; Rychwalski v. Baranowski, 205 Wis. 193, 196, 236 N.W. 131, 132 (1931) (dictum) ; see cases cited Annot.,
61 A.L.R.2d 1318, 1322 (1958) ; courts have sustained restrictions which were reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding the case. See, e.g., Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930) (nature of the business-lending
money-required honest, competent management); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp.,
spra (complied with New York Corporation Law which allowed restrictions);
Rychwalski v. Baranowski, supra (contract between shareholders giving remaining
holders an option for thirty days to buy the seller's shares). However, restrictions
will not be allowed when they serve no valid corporate purpose, see 2 O'NEAL, op.
cit. supra at 10 n.25, or where there is inadequate consideration, see Palmer v.
Chamberlain, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951).
Although large publicly held corporations are not precluded from placing similar
restrictions on their shareholders, these companies usually do not restrict free transferability, in order to encourage rather than discourage extensive exchange of their
shares.
2 2 O'NEAI, op. cit. upra note 1, at 15.
3 If no price is specified there is a risk that the agreement will be unenforceable
because of vagueness. See Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 Atl. 118 (1924).
4 2 'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 35.
Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 Atl. 1127 (1896) ; BrinckerhoffFarris Trust and Say. Co. v. Home Lumber Co., 118 Mo. 447, 24 S.W. 129 (1893);
Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 21 R.I. 9, 41 AtI. 258 (1898).
6 See, e.g., Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930);
Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 At. 118 (1924); cases cited Note, 44
CORNELL L.Q. 133, 135 n.15 (1958).
72 O'NEa., op. cit. supra note 1, at 13-14. In upholding such agreements courts
have required the existence of a valid business purpose for the restriction. Such
valid purposes include: keeping outsiders out, Talbott v. Nibert, 167 Kan. 138, 148-49,
206 P.2d 131, 139 (1949) ; concentrating control in the hands of those who are congenial, Coleman v. Kettering, 289 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) ; preventing
competitors from using a minority interest as a means of ferreting out secret informa-
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While the courts generally support the policies underlying buy and
sell agreements, conflicting policies occasionally limit the operation of
these arrangements. One such instance was presented by the recent case
of Burk Estate.8 In Burk, the decedent owned four shares of stock in a
close corporation, and his son by a previous marriage owned the remaining
two shares. In 1948, they executed a buy and sell agreement whereby
the survivor was given the option to purchase the deceased's shares at one
hundred dollars eachY The book value of the stock at the time of the agreement was 2,000 dollars per share, and at the decedent's death fifteen years
later it was 12,000 dollars per share. The decedent's will directed that the
agreement be carried out and that his estate be left according to the intestate
laws. His surviving spouse elected to take against the will,10 objecting that
the valuation of the decedent's shares of stock at 400 dollars substantially
prejudiced her marital rights. The orphans' court held that the widow was
entitled to a fractional interest in the stock itself rather than merely in its
value." The court concluded that the widow, in taking the stock itself, was
not bound by the buy and sell agreement, her rights not being subject to the
contractual obligation in favor of the son.
It seems clear, in the light of Mather Estate,22 a case decided two
years earlier by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that the crucial factor
in Burk was the presence of the widow's rights. 13 In Mather, a similar
agreement had been executed, stating an option price of one dollar per share
at a time when the fair market value of the stock was fifty dollars. At the
decedent's death the value of the stock had increased to 1,060 dollars per
share, and the executor refused to sell it to the surviving stockholder for the
option price. The court decided that the disparity between the option price
tion, Rychwalski v. Baranowski, 205 Wis. 193, 196, 236 N.W. 131, 132 (1931); and
allowing incorporators to maintain control of a corporation to which they have contributed their energies and fortunes, Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 602, 124

Atl. 118, 121 (1924).

8 15 Fiduciary Rep. 449 (Montgomery County, Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1965).
9 He was also given a right of first refusal on any inter vivos transfers of the
stock.
10 The widow's election was made pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.8
(Supp. 1965) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1965).

1115 Fiduciary Rep. at 454. The court in Burk relied on Runyan Estate, 21 Pa. D.
& C.2d 180 (Fulton County, Pa. Orphans' Ct 1960), which held that where the testator
devised real estate to his wife for life, then to his daughter for her life, remainder
to daughter's issue, and where the widow took against the will, she was entitled to
one-half of the real estate, not merely one-half of the value of the land. The Burk
court, therefore, extended a holding involving real estate to a personal property case.
In view of Gallagher's Estate, 76 Pa. 296 (1874) (Sharswood, J.), which held that
where personal property was involved the widow was entitled to a fractional interest
in the value of the property rather than in the property itself, this extension may
have been improper.
Furthermore, the court in Runyan also made what may have been an improper
extension. It relied on Wagner v. Custer, 52 York L.R. 61 (C.P. York County, Pa.
1938), which held that the widow and the remainderman under the will together could
convey a merchantable title and therefore could maintain an action for specific performance. The determination whether the widow's interest was in the land itself or
merely in the proceeds of the sale was unnecessary.
12410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963).
13 A comment on the Mather decision suggested that the court might not have
upheld the agreement if the rights of a surviving spouse had been involved. Note,
59 Nw. U.L. REv. 91, 97-98 (1964).
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and the fair market value of the stock was not sufficient to invalidate the
agreement or to defeat specific performance. 14 Thus, in Mather, where the
rights of a widow were not involved, the state supreme court upheld the buy
and sell agreement, though the option price was a small fraction of the
market value of the stock, while in Burk, the orphans' court held that a
similar agreement was not binding on the widow. 5
The law has gone to great lengths to protect the widow from being
disinherited by her husband. At common law, the widow was entitled to a
life interest in one-third of all lands of which her husband was solely and
beneficially seised during coverture--her dower interest. 6 At present,
however, since decedents generally leave estates which are composed mostly
of personal property, most jurisdictions provide the widow with a statutory
share of the husband's real and personal estate. 1 7 Reasons such as fairness 1
and giving the widow her share of family property 19 have been advanced
for allowing the surviving spouse to take this share. Whatever the specific reason, there is, as the court in Burk noted, a long established policy
in Pennsylvania to protect the rights of widows in the estates of their
husbands.2 0
The Burk court apparently determined that upholding the buy and
sell agreement would prevent the widow from enjoying the financial interests accorded her under the statutory share provisions and would therefore
prejudice her marital rights. Thus it ruled that the widow was not bound
by the agreement. In so holding the court was unclear whether the agreement was governed solely by the election provision of section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Wills Act,2 1 or was inter vivos but within section 11 of the
Pennsylvania Estates Act.2
The court quoted section 11 of the Estates
Act 2 3 and emphasized the decedent's right to consume the principal value of
14 A large portion of the shares owned by the decedent at his death had been
purchased from his brother many years earlier pursuant to the agreement in question.
The court pointed out the incongruity of the executor's questioning the validity of the
agreement where his decedent had already benefited from its provisions. However,
since the court did not base its decision on this point, this feature does not distinguish Mather from Burk.
15 It is not clear whether the court held that the agreement was not binding on
the widow alone or that the agreement was wholly invalid.
10 For the origin and development of common law dower, see Haskins, The Development of Common Law Dower, 62 HARv. L. REv. 42 (1948).
17 MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 3 (1960). For an index of the
various state statutes see Phipps, Marital Property Interests, 27 RocKY MT. L. REV.

180 (1955).
18 Because people normally devise most of their estates to those who are related
by blood or marriage, it would seem unfair to do otherwise. Since a fair minded
husband would devise a substantial part of his estate to his widow, if he fails to do
so the law will do it for hin. Simes, Protecting the Surviving Spouse by Restraints
on the Dead Hand, 26 U. CiNc. L. Rv. 1, 5-6 (1957).

the
for
fail
161

19 Because the family unit prospers through the joint efforts of husband and wife,
law has taken steps to provide the wife with her share of the property to be used
the support of her and the children should the husband, intentionally or otherwise,
to do so. Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Title & Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 579-80,
Atl. 721, 724 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
20 15 Fiduciary Rep. at 454.
21 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.8 (Supp. 1965).
22
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1965).
2 15 Fiduciary Rep. at 453.
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his holdings 2 4m-a section 11 concept, yet it treated the stock as an asset
of his probate estate --- a section 8 concept.
Under section 11 a conveyance of assets with the retention of a
power of appointment, revocation or consumption may be treated as a
testamentary disposition by the surviving spouse.2 6 Although the policy
behind this section-preventing the deceased from defeating his spouse's
marital rights through an inter vivos transfer of property over which he
has retained practical control-indicates that certain contracts should be
considered conveyances within the section, its wording seems to limit its
applicability to certain types of trusts. "Power of appointment," "power
of revocation," "power of consumption," "principal" and "income beneficiary" are all terms which are commonly used in the field of trust administration; and although a devise of stock can be called an "appointment by
will" and the wasting of corporate assets can be called "consumption of
principal," these terms are not ordinarily used in that manner. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has therefore limited the applicability of section
11 to certain types of trusts. 27 It is thus quite difficult to fit an agreement
such as that in Burk within the operation of section 11; the widow must
rely solely on section 8.
Section 8 allows the surviving spouse to elect against the will and take
"one-third of the real and personal estate of the testator .
2

.

.

. "2

The

4 Id. at 455.
25
2 Id. at 453.
6 Section 11 provides:
A conveyance of assets by a person who retains a power of appointment
by will, or a power of revocation or consumption over the principal thereof,
shall at the election of his surviving spouse, be treated as a testamentary
disposition so far as the surviving spouse is concerned to the extent to which
the power has been reserved, but the right of the surviving spouse shall be
subject to the rights of any income beneficiary whose interest in income becomes vested in enjoyment prior to the death of the conveyor.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1965).
Because the statutory share is generally aimed at keeping a portion of the family
property within the family unit for its maintenance and support after the husband's
death, it operates only on the property included in the husband's estate. It is therefore
possible for a husband to defeat his widow by giving away his property while still
alive. Most husbands, however, are reluctant to give away property while they are
alive solely to defeat their wives, for to do so would mean that they, too, would lose
its benefits. One way of circumventing this difficulty is ostensibly to make an inter
vivos transfer while in reality retaining complete control through the use of the trust
mechanism. Courts, however, have determined that these transfers should not defeat
the widow's statutory share if they are "illusory," Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371,
9"N.E.2d 966 (1937), "sham," In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120
(1951), or motivated by a fraudulent intent. In re Sides' Estate, 119 Neb. 314, 228
N.W. 619 (1930). When the widow successfully attacks such a transfer, the entire
trust falls into the estate.
Under § 11, the widow may attack certain types of inter vivos trusts without a
determination that the trust is "testamentary," and the trust will be invalidated only
insofar as the widow's rights are affected. If other beneficiaries under the will wish
to attack the trust, they must prevail under the traditional standards.
27 In re Behan's Estate, 399 Pa. 314, 321, 160 A.2d 209, 214 (1960).
28 Section 8 provides:
(a) Right of Election. When a married person dies testate as to any
part of his estate the surviving spouse while living shall have a right of election under the limitations and conditions hereinafter stated: Provided, that the
spouse so electing must also elect to take against all conveyances within the
scope of subsection (a) of section 11 of the Estates Act of 1947, as amended,
of which he is a beneficiary.
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statute does not specify whether the widow, by her election, is entitled to
the stock itself or merely the proceeds of the sale to the surviving shareholder. Although it is not apparent that the widow is entitled to the stock
itself, as the court in Burk concluded,2 9 it may be persuasively argued that
this is the correct interpretation, 0 for to hold otherwise would enable testators to avoid the effect of a section 8 election by contracting to "sell"
their property for a nominal amount instead of simply devising it to the
intended beneficiaries. 3
This interpretation was followed in Runyan
Estate 32 and adopted by the the Burk court.P If the widow, by her election, is entitled to the stock, the question then arises whether she receives
the stock subject to the contractual obligation in favor of the surviving
shareholder.
Generally, if a contractual obligation does not require personal services
of the decedent, his death will not discharge itas and the estate therefore
will be bound to carry it out. The stock involved in buy and sell agreements
operative upon death passes to the estate subject to the equitable right of
the surviving shareholder to compel specific performance of the contract.3 5
Under Pennsylvania law, if a person dies before the consummation of a
binding agreement to sell real or personal property, 6 "his personal representative shall have power to consummate it, but if he does not do so, the
court . . . may order specific performance of the agreement . . . . ,
Because specific performance is an equitable action, the court will also look
to the equities favoring those seeking to prevent it. In a Burk situation
the court should weigh the equities of upholding the buy and sell agreement
(b) Share of Estate. The surviving spouse, upon an election to take
against the will, shall be entitled to one-third of the real and personal estate
of the testator, if the testator is survived by more than one child, or by one
or more children and the issue of a deceased child or children, or by the issue
of more than one deceased child, and in all other circumstances the surviving
spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the real and personal estate of the
testator.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.8 (Supp. 1965).
29 15 Fiduciary Rep. at 453-54.
aO But see BPRY, INTESTATE, WILLS & ESTATES ACTS OF 1947 2609 (1949).
31 If the widow were entitled to a fractional share in the proceeds, her interest
would be limited to a share of the consideration which would, in most cases, be nominal.
Therefore, unless she were cut out of the will entirely, she would be better off taking
under the will than making a § 8 election.
32 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 180 (Fulton County, Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1960).
33 See note 11 supra.
34 6 WI.LIsTOx, CONTRACTS

§ 1945 (rev. ed. 1938). See, e.g., Young v. Gongaware, 275 Pa. 285, 119 At. 271 (1922).
35 See Mather Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963).
36 In a buy and sell agreement operative upon death, obviously one party must
die before the consummation of the sale.
37 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 32 0.620(a) (1950). According to the Joint State
Government Commission's comments following this section, subsection (a) now
includes personal as well as real estate. The comments further point out that this
may prevent irreparable harm "where the decedent agreed to purchase or sell the
controlling shares in a close corporation."
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against the widow's equities-the public policy of protecting the widow
as expressed by section 8 of the Wills Act.
Utilization of this balancing process does not necessarily create a conflict, at least on the policy level. The policy behind allowing reasonable
restrictions on stock transfers is one of control-allowing the shareholders
to choose their future associates and to maintain control of the enterprise. 38
On the other hand, the policy behind allowing the widow to take a statutory share by election is financial-providing her with a share of family
property for maintenance and support.39 These policies are not in conflict,
for it is possible to accomplish both goals by a decree that the surviving
shareholders are entitled to receive the stock in accordance with the wishes
of the decedent by payment to the widow of the fair market value of the
stock to which she is entitled by her election. 40 The stock owned by the
decedent which is not included in the widow's election would be transferred
to the surviving shareholders for the price specified in the agreement, for
there are no overriding policy considerations operative on this portion of
the agreement. In effect, with regard to the heirs generally, the result in
Mather is followed, whereas with regard to the widow the fair market value
must be paid for the stock. Under this result the shareholder would be
able to retain control of the corporation 41 and would still get the benefit of
the favorable price as to the stock not covered by the widow's election. The
38 See note 7 supra.
39 See notes 18-19 supra. Although claims of decedent's creditors were not at
issue in Burk, in those cases where such claims do exist the creditors may have
equitable standing similar to that of the widow and may thereby be able to set aside
the buy
and sell agreement insofar as it prejudices their rights to estate assets.
40
Administratively, the situation would be handled as follows: the widow would
make her election and obtain the right to a fractional share in the stock subject to the
surviving shareholder's right to purchase it for fair market value; upon payment to
her of this amount, she would release her rights to the stock in favor of the shareholder.
In Pennsylvania the surviving spouse has up to one year from the date of probate
to elect against the will (in some cases, she may be granted an extension). See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.11 (Supp. 1965). It would therefore be advisable for the
personal representative either to wait until the expiration of this period or to obtain
the approval of the widow before carrying out the terms of the buy and sell agreement.
If the widow were to make her election after the completion of the agreement, the
personal respresentative might be surcharged for the difference between the contract
price and the fair market value to which the widow is entitled. Cf. Blish Trust,
350 Pa. 311, 38 A.2d 9 (1944) ; Newcomer Estate, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 99 (York County,
Pa. 41
Orphans' Ct 1956).
While in Burk, a single stockholder would be given complete ownership, in
most cases a group of stockholders would receive the decedent's shares. In a case
where the widow elects against the will, there is probably some degree of discord in
the family; this lack of congeniality is one of the major reasons for keeping control
in the hands of the existing shareholders. See note 7 slupra.
In the Burk situation, where the surviving shareholder has an option to purchase
the shares, he need not perform the agreement if he believes that the fair market
value is too great a price to pay for the privilege of keeping out outsiders. Where the
surviving shareholder has an obligation to purchase instead of an option, a new
problem arises-is he obligated to pay the fair market value regardless of the price
specified in the agreement, or is his obligation limited to the price in the agreement?
If the latter, does he get all the shares specified or only that number which can be
purchased at fair market value for the total price which the agreement obligates him
to pay? A suggested solution is to obligate him to purchase whatever shares can
be bought for the total price specified in the agreement and to give him the option
of buying the additional number of shares specified at their fair market value.
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widow would receive the fair market value of the stock 42 and would avoid
being placed in the disadvantageous position of being a minority shareholder in a close corporation. 43 The only parties who would not benefit
by this compromise would be the other legatees of the estate who would
still be bound by the option price of the agreement.44 However, they would
not be in a worse position than under the Mather result.
The approach taken to reach this compromise-that of a court modifying a contract-is not novel. By allowing the equity of redemption, chancery courts in England modified the terms of mortgage contracts to prevent
the unconscionable result of a mortgagor losing all rights to property because he was late in paying the mortgagee. 45 Although an orphans' court
is not strictly a chancery court, in Pennsylvania it is given exclusive jurisdiction of specific performance of contracts made by a decedent 4 and with
respect to such contracts it has all the powers of a chancery court.47 This
compromise is also consistent with section 8 of the Wills Act. If the surviving shareholder exercises his option, the widow receives the fair market
value of the shares; if he does not, she gets the shares outright. In either
case, she has received her fractional share of the estate.
Under this result one important problem remains-how to determine
the fair market value of the shares. The problem of valuation of close
corporation stock is a source of much litigation and confusion.4" While it
is generally recognized that there is no one formula for determining the
value of these shares,49 several factors such as book value, earnings, sales
42

It is unclear whether the Burk result is limited to those cases where the differ-

ence between the fair market value of the stock and the contract price is unreasonably
large or applies to all cases in which there is any disparity. If it applies only to the
former, then courts must determine at what point the difference becomes unreasonably
large. Under the suggested compromise the courts need not make this determination
for the widow should be allowed to challenge the agreement price whenever she
believes that it does not reflect market value.
43 Because stockholders are active in most close corporations, they receive salaries
for their services. It is therefore rarely necessary to pay them dividends on their
investment. In addition, the double tax on corporate dividends makes it very unfavorable to distribute profits in the form of dividends. Of course, any salary in
excess of a reasonable amount will be considered a dividend for tax purposes. Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-8 (1958). When an active shareholder dies, his family is left with stock
on which little or no dividends accrue. If less than a majority of stock is owned,
the family is usually "locked in" because there is little market for minority interests
in close corporations. This puts them in the position of having stock which cannot
be transferred and which provides little or no income. In Burk, the widow wanted
to be placed in this position, but only when the alternative was accepting $100 per
share for her interests.
44 The widow's attack might also have adverse federal estate tax consequences.
See note 50 infra.
45 See, e.g., Emanuel College v. Evans, 1 Car. 1, 21 Eng. Rep. 494 (Ch. 1625).
46PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §2080.301(9) (1964).
47 See In re Starz' Estate, 353 Pa. 612, 46 A.2d 486 (1946) ; In re Slagle's Estate,
335 Pa. 552, 7 A.2d 353 (1939) ; It re Gibson's Estate, 153 Pa. Super. 413, 34 A.2d
159 (1943) ; Shultz' Estate, 55 Schuylkill L.R. 181 (Schuylkill County, Pa. Orphans'
Ct. 1959).
48 Page, Setting the Price in a Close CorporationBuy-Sell Agreement, 57 MicH.
L. Rxv. 656 (1959).
49 See, e.g., Kascle, Valuation of Closely Held Corporations, 43 TAXES 454
(1965); Schwingle, FiduciariesNeed Dependable Valuation of Closely Held Stocks,
100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 555 (1961); Note, 11 N.Y.L.F. 315 (1965).
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and management are important considerations. 50 In Burk, where the option
price is not related to the market value and where no provision is made
for periodic revaluation, various methods for determining market value
are available to the court: the court may simply adopt the value placed on
the shares for estate tax purposes, as approved by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue; it may let the litigants determine the fair market value
through arbitration; or the court itself may determine fair market value
by appointing a master to make the valuation.
The result in Burk has created serious problems for estate planners
and for owners of closely held corporations who have relied on the validity
of buy and sell agreements to further both business and personal interests.
The compromise suggested will have the effect of enabling the businessman
to further these interests while at the same time protecting the widow's
statutory share. 51 The surviving shareholders will retain the right to
choose future associates and control the corporation, but will have to pay
the fair market value of the stock to keep that right. Only in this way can
both the shareholders' rights and the widow's rights receive maximum
protection.
5

10 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 59-1 Cum. BULL. 237, contains a detailed list of factors. For
a discussion of advantages of using various factors, see 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS

§ 7.24 (1958).

A buy and sell agreement itself may set a price for estate tax purposes, but in
order to do so the agreement must be an arm's length transaction, which the one in
Burk obviously was not. Use of these agreements in setting estate tax valuation is
treated in Butala, Restrictive Agreements: Their Effect Upon the Tax Valuation of
Corporate Stock, 105 TRUSTS & ESrATms 15 (1966).
In cases where the option price approximates the fair market value of the stock
and where the parties have made provision for periodic revaluation of the option price,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may adopt the option price for the estate tax
valuation. If, however, the widow were to question the fairness of the option price
by. her section 8 election, the Commissioner might also question the accuracy of this
price for the estate tax valuation. The widow's election, therefore, may have the

effect of increasing the valuation of the estate and hence the estate tax, though the
Commissioner would otherwise have accepted the agreement price. While an increase
in estate taxes would not affect the widow so long as the stock she receives qualifies

for the marital deduction, it would harm the other legatees of the estate who would
have the tax apportioned to their shares. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 884 (Supp.
1965).

51 In cases where the agreement specifies a price equal to the fair market value
there will be no change in its operation. Only in those agreements which specify a

price less than the fair market value will there be some change, but only so far as
the widow's fractional share is concerned, since only this part of the agreement violates the policy of protecting the widow's rights expressed by section 8 of the Wills Act.
If the price specified is more than fair market value, there will be no reason for the
widow to make an election; she will merely take her share of the proceeds under the
will. However, under these circumstances the holder of the option may not exercise
it, thereby leaving the widow as a minority stockholder.

